AMENDMENT TO RULES COMMITTEE PRINT FOR H.R. 6395

OFFERED BY MR. MALINOWSKI OF NEW JERSEY

At the end of title XII, add the following:

1 Subtitle H—Protecting Security

2 Assistance From Corruption Act

- 3 SEC. 1281. SHORT TITLE.
- 4 This subtitle may be cited as the "Protecting Security
- 5 Assistance from Corruption Act".
- 6 SEC. 1282. FINDINGS.
- 7 Congress finds the following:
- 8 (1) Over the past 15 years, the United States
- 9 has provided more than \$200 billion in military and
- security assistance to over 100 countries around the
- 11 world to address shared international security
- threats.
- 13 (2) In countries such as Afghanistan, Iraq,
- Mali, Yemen, and Somalia, corruption has been a
- significant factor behind the failure of United
- 16 States-supported national security forces to effec-
- tively and legitimately respond to terrorist threats.
- 18 (3) Abusive and corrupt security forces are a
- 19 key determinant of support for extremism. In fragile

1	partners, corrupt and predatory behavior by local of-
2	ficials generates resentment and resistance against
3	the central government and security forces.
4	(4) Inspectors General have frequently pointed
5	to key avenues through which corruption can nega-
6	tively impact United States security objectives and
7	end-states, such as buying and selling senior na-
8	tional security force positions, selling United States-
9	provided equipment and fuel on the black market or
10	to criminal groups, and creating ghost soldiers.
11	(5) In the past, United States military assist-
12	ance has inadvertently found its way directly into
13	the hands of terrorists. In Afghanistan, the Special
14	Inspector General for Afghanistan Reconstruction
15	found that the use of shell companies allowed
16	Taliban-supporting persons to contract with the
17	United States military for food, construction, and
18	cleaning services.
19	(6) The Special Inspector General for Afghani-
20	stan Reconstruction also found that billions of dol-
21	lars of United States reconstruction funds were si-
22	phoned out of Afghanistan by corrupt officials, fuel-
23	ing resentment of central government authorities.
24	(7) Several United States partners have system-
25	atically supported certain units of their national se-

1 curity forces while marginalizing others in order to 2 bolster their power, generating factional divisions within these forces, undermining overall security sec-3 tor effectiveness, and at times fueled mutinies, mili-5 tary coups, and instability. 6 (8) Failure to conduct due diligence prior to 7 contract disbursements in support of cooperative 8 military programs and exercises in fragile states 9 could reinforce the control of predatory and abusive 10 governance structures, fueling extremism and anti-11 government contestation. 12 (9) While not always a sign of corruption, in-13 dustrial offsets are also sometimes used to reinforce 14 abusive governance structures in corrupt, extremism-15 prone countries by requiring foreign defense sup-16 pliers to provide specific kickbacks into companies 17 owned by regime officials, their families, and associ-18 ates. 19 (10) Achieving the objectives of military assist-20 ance and security programs requires meaningful due 21 diligence to ensure that United States funds are not 22 benefiting corrupt officials, reinforcing repressive 23 governance structures, or indirectly benefiting ter-24 rorists, extremists, transnational criminal organiza-

25

tions, and other bad actors.

1	(11) As a result of these risks, Congress ap-
2	proved language in the National Defense Authoriza-
3	tion Act for Fiscal Year 2016 that called on the De-
4	partment of Defense to create a strategic framework
5	for United States security cooperation and identify
6	challenges, including related to corruption, to
7	achieve United States security cooperation's primary
8	objectives, priorities, and desired end-states.
9	(12) In the National Defense Authorization Act
10	for Fiscal Year 2017, Congress also urged the De-
11	partment of Defense to develop and maintain "an
12	assessment, monitoring, and evaluation framework
13	for security cooperation with foreign countries to en-
14	sure accountability".
15	(13) During the same time, the Department of
16	State created a "Framework for Policy Review and
17	Risk Assessment of Proposed SSA Activities", which
18	called on the Department to ask key corruption-re-
19	lated questions about the proposed recipient of
20	United States security assistance prior to providing
21	that assistance, such as "is the security force known
22	to be or reported to bepermitting illicit traf-
23	ficking across borders, buying and selling positions
24	or professional opportunities, stealing government
25	assets and resources, engaging in bribery, or main-

1	taining rolls of ghost personnel", among other
2	questions.
3	(14) However, the Department of Defense and
4	the Department of State have yet to fully incor-
5	porate many of these key assessments needed to ef-
6	fectively identify and mitigate corruption-related
7	risks that continue to undermine United States secu-
8	rity cooperation activities around the world.
9	SEC. 1283. DEFINITIONS.
10	In this subtitle:
11	(1) Appropriate congressional commit-
12	TEES.—The term "appropriate congressional com-
13	mittees" means—
14	(A) the Committee on Armed Services and
15	the Committee on Foreign Affairs of the House
16	of Representatives; and
17	(B) the Committee on Armed Services and
18	the Committee on Foreign Relations of the Sen-
19	ate.
20	(2) COVERED SECURITY ASSISTANCE.—
21	(A) Part I.—For purposes of part I, the
22	term "covered security assistance" means a
23	program or activity of the Department of De-
24	fense that—

1	(i) is carried out under the authority
2	of chapter 16 of title 10, United States
3	Code; and
4	(ii) is valued at more than \$1,000,000
5	on a fiscal year basis.
6	(B) Part II.—For purposes of part II, the
7	term "covered security assistance" means—
8	(i) a program or activity of the De-
9	partment of State or the Department of
10	Commerce that—
11	(I) is carried out under the au-
12	thority of part II of the Foreign As-
13	sistance Act of 1961 (22 U.S.C. 2151
14	et seq.) or the Arms Export Control
15	Act (22 U.S.C. 2751 et seq.) to pro-
16	vide military or civilian security as-
17	sistance to a foreign country; and
18	(II) is valued at more than
19	\$1,000,000 on a fiscal year basis; and
20	(ii) a program or activity of the De-
21	partment of Defense that meets the re-
22	quirements described in subclauses (I) and
23	(II) of clause (i) and is carried out with
24	the concurrence of the Secretary of State.

1	(3) COVERED FOREIGN COUNTRY.—The term
2	"covered foreign country" means a country that—
3	(A) is receiving covered security assistance,
4	as such term is defined in subparagraph (A) or
5	(B) of paragraph (1), as the case may be, with
6	an aggregate value of not less than \$4,000,000;
7	and
8	(B)(i) is ranked E or F on the Trans-
9	parency International Defense Corruption
10	Index, or a successor to such index;
11	(ii) is ranked at an equivalent level of cor-
12	ruption for the security sector under any inde-
13	pendent index funded by the Department of
14	State of any other Federal agency; or
15	(iii) is determined and reported by the Sec-
16	retary of State in the Federal Register as ex-
17	hibiting elevated risks of public corruption in
18	the security sector, if such determination is ac-
19	companied in the Federal Register by a defini-
20	tion of the methodology and factors used in
21	such determination, including—
22	(I) ethnic or religious favoritism in re-
23	cruitment and retention practices of secu-
24	rity forces;

1	(II) merit-based promotion practices
2	in security services;
3	(III) bribery, extortion, and predatory
4	practices by security forces;
5	(IV) corruption within security forces;
6	(V) civilian control and parliamentary
7	oversight of security services;
8	(VI) involvement of security forces in
9	political decision-making;
10	(VII) human rights abuses and vio-
11	lence by the state-sanctioned security serv-
12	ices;
13	(VIII) efficacy of delivery of public
14	justice services; and
15	(IX) violent deaths by geography and
16	cause.
17	(4) COVERED GOVERNMENT OFFICIALS.—The
18	term "covered government officials", with respect to
19	a covered foreign country, means—
20	(A) officials of the government, military, or
21	security services;
22	(B) individuals who assume unofficial lead-
23	ership functions, such as tribal officials, heads
24	of informal courts, or other unelected or
25	unappointed leadership;

1	(C) advisors or associates of senior govern-
2	ment officials;
3	(D) individuals involved, directly or indi-
4	rectly, in security assistance activities; or
5	(E) family members or associates of indi-
6	viduals described in subparagraphs (A) through
7	(D).
8	(5) Export administration regulations.—
9	The term "Export Administration Regulations"
10	means subchapter C of chapter VII of title 15, Code
11	of Federal Regulations, or successor regulations.
12	(6) International traffic in arms regula-
13	TIONS.—The term "International Traffic in Arms
14	Regulations" means subchapter M of chapter I of
15	title 22, Code of Federal Regulations, or successor
16	regulations.
17	(7) Offset agreement.—The term "offset
18	agreement" has the meaning given that term in sec-
19	tion $36(e)(1)$ of the Arms Export Control Act (22
20	U.S.C. $2776(e)(1)$).

1	PART I—MATTERS RELATING TO SECURITY AS-
2	SISTANCE ADMINISTERED BY THE DEPART-
3	MENT OF DEFENSE
4	SEC. 1291. ANTI-CORRUPTION RISK ASSESSMENT.
5	The Secretary of Defense, in coordination with the
6	Secretary of State and the heads of other relevant Federal
7	departments and agencies, shall ensure that any due dili-
8	gence review conducted prior to the provision of covered
9	security assistance to a covered foreign country includes
10	an assessment of the risks that such assistance could fos-
11	ter public corruption in the country, including specifically
12	and individually by—
13	(1) indirectly or directly financially or materi-
14	ally benefitting covered government officials of the
15	country;
16	(2) empowering officials or units of the security
17	forces documented or suspected of corruption, brib-
18	ery, or political repression;
19	(3) contracting or subcontracting for delivery,
20	logistics, contracting, or other services related to
21	covered security assistance that are owned, in whole
22	or in part, by covered government officials; and
23	(4) failing to provide for effective civilian gov-
24	ernment, parliamentary, and public oversight.

1	SEC. 1292. BENEFICIAL OWNERSHIP INFORMATION OF CON-
2	TRACTORS AND SUBCONTRACTORS PRO-
3	VIDING COVERED SECURITY ASSISTANCE.
4	(a) In General.—Not later than 1 year after the
5	date of the enactment of this Act, the Secretary of Defense
6	shall issue regulations to require each contract for the pro-
7	vision of covered security assistance in a covered foreign
8	country to identify the beneficial owner of each contractor
9	and subcontractor providing such assistance under the
10	contract, including—
11	(1) each advisor, broker, and consultant pro-
12	viding services in connection with the contract; and
13	(2) each individual and entity providing train-
14	ing, advice, or support services, construction serv-
15	ices, or logistical, shipping, storage, or customs-proc-
16	essing services in connection with the contract.
17	(b) Delay for Provision of Information.—The
18	information required under subsection (a) may be ap-
19	pended to a contract not later than 30 days after the date
20	of completion of the contract.
21	(c) Access to Information.—The information re-
22	quired under subsection (a)—
23	(1) shall be included or appended to a contract
24	in unclassified form; and
25	(2) shall be made available upon request to—

1	(A) other Federal departments and agen-
2	cies; and
3	(B) the appropriate congressional commit-
4	tees.
5	SEC. 1293. ENSURING COVERED SECURITY ASSISTANCE IS
6	NOT USED TO ENRICH FOREIGN GOVERN-
7	MENT OFFICIALS.
8	(a) IN GENERAL.—Not later than 1 year after the
9	date of the enactment of this Act, the Secretary of Defense
10	shall issue regulations to prohibit disbursement of funds
11	under a contract for the provision of covered security as-
12	sistance in a covered foreign country to any foreign entity
13	that is owned in part or in whole by a covered government
14	official of the country.
15	(b) Waiver in the Interest of National Secu-
16	RITY.—The Secretary of Defense may waive the applica-
17	tion of subsection (a) with respect to a foreign entity if
18	the Secretary determines and submits to the appropriate
19	congressional committees written notice and justification
20	not later than 30 days before granting the waiver that the
21	waiver is in the national security interests of the United
22	States.
23	(c) Other Waiver Authorities.—The Secretary
24	of Defense may waive the application of subsection (a)
25	with respect to a foreign entity if the Secretary determines

1	and submits to the appropriate congressional committees
2	written notice and justification not later than 30 days be-
3	fore granting the waiver that the ownership of such enti-
4	ty—
5	(1) is through stock ownership of a publicly
6	traded company and whose share of such stocks is—
7	(A) less than five percent of such foreign
8	entity's traded shares; or
9	(B) valued at less than \$5,000,000; or
10	(2) is through blind investment in mutual funds
11	or other composite investment vehicles that would
12	render a shareholder's control over fund-owned com-
13	panies negligible.
13 14	panies negligible. SEC. 1294. INDEPENDENT DATA ON GOVERNANCE AND
14	SEC. 1294. INDEPENDENT DATA ON GOVERNANCE AND
14 15	SEC. 1294. INDEPENDENT DATA ON GOVERNANCE AND CORRUPTION OF UNITED STATES PARTNERS.
14 15 16 17	SEC. 1294. INDEPENDENT DATA ON GOVERNANCE AND CORRUPTION OF UNITED STATES PARTNERS. (a) IN GENERAL.—Of the amounts made available to
14 15 16 17	SEC. 1294. INDEPENDENT DATA ON GOVERNANCE AND CORRUPTION OF UNITED STATES PARTNERS. (a) IN GENERAL.—Of the amounts made available to the Department of Defense for security cooperation and
14 15 16 17	SEC. 1294. INDEPENDENT DATA ON GOVERNANCE AND CORRUPTION OF UNITED STATES PARTNERS. (a) IN GENERAL.—Of the amounts made available to the Department of Defense for security cooperation and capacity-building activities, the Secretary of Defense, in
114 115 116 117 118	SEC. 1294. INDEPENDENT DATA ON GOVERNANCE AND CORRUPTION OF UNITED STATES PARTNERS. (a) In General.—Of the amounts made available to the Department of Defense for security cooperation and capacity-building activities, the Secretary of Defense, in coordination with the Secretary of State, shall provide
14 15 16 17 18 19 20	SEC. 1294. INDEPENDENT DATA ON GOVERNANCE AND CORRUPTION OF UNITED STATES PARTNERS. (a) IN GENERAL.—Of the amounts made available to the Department of Defense for security cooperation and capacity-building activities, the Secretary of Defense, in coordination with the Secretary of State, shall provide funding for the research and publication by independent
14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21	SEC. 1294. INDEPENDENT DATA ON GOVERNANCE AND CORRUPTION OF UNITED STATES PARTNERS. (a) IN GENERAL.—Of the amounts made available to the Department of Defense for security cooperation and capacity-building activities, the Secretary of Defense, in coordination with the Secretary of State, shall provide funding for the research and publication by independent institutions of indexed data on the internal governance ca-
14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23	SEC. 1294. INDEPENDENT DATA ON GOVERNANCE AND CORRUPTION OF UNITED STATES PARTNERS. (a) In General.—Of the amounts made available to the Department of Defense for security cooperation and capacity-building activities, the Secretary of Defense, in coordination with the Secretary of State, shall provide funding for the research and publication by independent institutions of indexed data on the internal governance capacities and professionalism of military and civilian secu-

1	measure and assess the effectiveness of security coopera-
2	tion and security sector capacity-building programs.
3	(b) MATTERS TO BE INCLUDED.—The indexed data
4	described in subsection (a) shall include quantifiable, year-
5	ly-updated, by-country metrics on—
6	(1) ethnic or religious favoritism in recruitment
7	and retention practices of security forces;
8	(2) merit-based promotion practices in security
9	services;
10	(3) bribery, extortion, and predatory practices
11	by security forces;
12	(4) corruption within security forces;
13	(5) civilian control and parliamentary oversight
14	of security services;
15	(6) involvement of security forces in political
16	decision-making;
17	(7) human rights abuses and violence by the
18	state-sanctioned security services;
19	(8) efficacy of delivery of public justice services;
20	and
21	(9) violent deaths by geography and cause.
22	SEC. 1295. REPORT ON IMPLEMENTATION.
23	(a) In General.—Not later than 120 days after the
24	date of the enactment of this Act, the Secretary of Defense
25	shall submit to the appropriate congressional committees

1	a report on plans of the Department of Defense to imple-
2	ment sections 1291, 1292, and 1293.
3	(b) Matters to Be Included.—The report re-
4	quired by subsection (a) shall include—
5	(1) a description of how such assessments and
6	regulations will be incorporated with ongoing De-
7	partment of Defense initiatives to assess, monitor,
8	and evaluate covered security assistance;
9	(2) the names of the offices in the Department
10	of Defense, the Department of State, and any other
11	relevant Federal department or agency that will par-
12	ticipate in any such assessments and regulatory im-
13	plementation;
14	(3) an identification of planned resource alloca-
15	tion for implementation of these sections; and
16	(4) a description of financial, personnel, re-
17	sources, and external limitations on conducting such
18	assessments and regulations and any likely impacts
19	on the integrity of such assessments.
20	(c) FORM.—The report required by subsection (a)
21	shall be submitted in unclassified form.

1	PART II—MATTERS RELATING TO SECURITY AS-
2	SISTANCE ADMINISTERED BY THE DEPART-
3	MENT OF STATE AND THE DEPARTMENT OF
4	COMMERCE
5	SEC. 1296. ANTI-CORRUPTION RISK ASSESSMENT.
6	The Secretary of State, in coordination with the Sec-
7	retary of Defense and the heads of other relevant Federal
8	departments and agencies, shall ensure that any due dili-
9	gence review conducted prior to the provision of covered
10	security assistance to a covered foreign country includes
11	an assessment of the risks that such assistance could fos-
12	ter public corruption in such country, including specifically
13	and individually by—
14	(1) indirectly or directly financially or materi-
15	ally benefitting covered government officials of the
16	country;
17	(2) empowering officials or units of the security
18	forces documented or suspected of corruption, brib-
19	ery, or political repression;
20	(3) contracting or subcontracting for delivery,
21	logistics, contracting, or other services related to
22	covered security assistance that are owned, in whole
23	or in part, by covered government officials; and
24	(4) failing to provide for effective civilian gov-
25	ernment, parliamentary, and public oversight.

1	SEC. 1297. BENEFICIAL OWNERSHIP INFORMATION OF CON-
2	TRACTORS AND SUBCONTRACTORS PRO-
3	VIDING COVERED SECURITY ASSISTANCE.
4	(a) In General.—Not later than 1 year after the
5	date of the enactment of this Act, the Secretary of State
6	shall issue regulations to require each contract for the pro-
7	vision of covered security assistance in a covered foreign
8	country to identify the beneficial owner of each contractor
9	and subcontractor providing such assistance under the
10	contract, including—
11	(1) each advisor, broker, and consultant pro-
12	viding services in connection with the contract; and
13	(2) each individual and entity providing train-
14	ing, advice, or support services, construction serv-
15	ices, or logistical, shipping, storage, or customs-proc-
16	essing services in connection with the contract.
17	(b) Delay for Provision of Information.—The
18	information required under subsection (a) may be ap-
19	pended to a contract not later than 30 days after the date
20	of completion of the contract.
21	(c) Access to Information.—The information re-
22	quired under subsection (a)—
23	(1) shall be included or appended to a contract
24	in unclassified form; and
25	(2) shall be made available upon request to—

1	(A) other Federal departments and agen-
2	cies; and
3	(B) the appropriate congressional commit-
4	tees.
5	SEC. 1298. ENSURING COVERED SECURITY ASSISTANCE IS
6	NOT USED TO ENRICH FOREIGN GOVERN-
7	MENT OFFICIALS.
8	(a) In General.—Not later than 1 year after the
9	date of the enactment of this Act, the Secretary of State
10	shall issue regulations to prohibit disbursement of funds
11	under a contract for the provision of covered security as-
12	sistance in a covered foreign country to any foreign entity
13	that is owned in part or in whole by a covered government
14	official of the country.
15	(b) Waiver in the Interest of National Secu-
16	RITY.—The Secretary of State may waive the application
17	of subsection (a) with respect to a foreign entity if the
18	Secretary determines and submits to the appropriate con-
19	gressional committees written notice and justification not
20	later than 30 days before granting the waiver that the
21	waiver is in the national security interests of the United
22	States.
23	(c) Other Waiver Authorities.—The Secretary
24	of State may waive the application of subsection (a) with
25	respect to a foreign entity if the Secretary determines and

1	submits to the appropriate congressional committees writ-
2	ten notice and justification not later than 30 days before
3	granting the waiver that the ownership of such entity is—
4	(1) through stock ownership of a publicly trad-
5	ed company and whose share of such stocks is—
6	(A) less than five percent of such foreign
7	entity's traded shares; or
8	(B) valued at less than \$5,000,000; or
9	(2) is through blind investment in mutual funds
10	or other composite investment vehicles that would
11	render a shareholder's control over fund-owned com-
12	panies negligible.
13	SEC. 1299. TRANSPARENCY RELATING TO OFFSET AGREE-
13 14	SEC. 1299. TRANSPARENCY RELATING TO OFFSET AGREE- MENTS.
14	MENTS.
14 15	MENTS. (a) In General.—Not later than 1 year after the
14 15 16 17	MENTS. (a) IN GENERAL.—Not later than 1 year after the date of the enactment of this Act, the Secretary of State
14 15 16 17	MENTS. (a) In General.—Not later than 1 year after the date of the enactment of this Act, the Secretary of State shall issue regulations under the International Traffic in
14 15 16 17	MENTS. (a) IN GENERAL.—Not later than 1 year after the date of the enactment of this Act, the Secretary of State shall issue regulations under the International Traffic in Arms Regulations and the Secretary of Commerce shall
114 115 116 117 118	MENTS. (a) IN GENERAL.—Not later than 1 year after the date of the enactment of this Act, the Secretary of State shall issue regulations under the International Traffic in Arms Regulations and the Secretary of Commerce shall issue regulations under the Export Administration Regu-
114 115 116 117 118 119 220	MENTS. (a) IN GENERAL.—Not later than 1 year after the date of the enactment of this Act, the Secretary of State shall issue regulations under the International Traffic in Arms Regulations and the Secretary of Commerce shall issue regulations under the Export Administration Regulations to require a United States person that is an appli-
14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21	MENTS. (a) IN GENERAL.—Not later than 1 year after the date of the enactment of this Act, the Secretary of State shall issue regulations under the International Traffic in Arms Regulations and the Secretary of Commerce shall issue regulations under the Export Administration Regulations to require a United States person that is an applicant for a license to export an item controlled under either
14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21	MENTS. (a) IN GENERAL.—Not later than 1 year after the date of the enactment of this Act, the Secretary of State shall issue regulations under the International Traffic in Arms Regulations and the Secretary of Commerce shall issue regulations under the Export Administration Regulations to require a United States person that is an applicant for a license to export an item controlled under either such Regulation which includes an offset agreement to

1	(1) The applicant agrees to provide on a public,
2	text-searchable website comprehensive information
3	on—
4	(A) beneficial ownership of foreign persons
5	involved in the offset agreement, including advi-
6	sors, brokers, and marketing entities; and
7	(B) beneficial ownership of foreign persons
8	benefiting from the offset agreement.
9	(2) The applicant agrees to provide an assess-
10	ment of corruption risks of the offset agreement,
11	which shall include information on each of the fol-
12	lowing:
13	(A) The recipients, deliverables, contract
14	value, and offset credits of the offset agree-
15	ment.
16	(B) The beneficial ownership of foreign
17	persons involved in the offset agreement and
18	the benefits that will be received under the off-
19	set agreement.
20	(C) Conflicts of interest or connections of
21	such beneficial ownership with the political
22	leadership of the country in which the offset
23	agreement will be carried out.

1	(D) Prior work or expertise of such bene-
2	ficial ownership in the fields in which they will
3	carry out activities under the offset agreement.
4	(E) Requirements or inducements imposed
5	on the applicant to use any specific brokers in
6	the recipient country to find individuals or enti-
7	ties to perform requirements under the offset
8	agreement.
9	(F) The affiliation of any broker used as
10	part of the offset agreement with the political
11	leadership of the country in which the offset
12	agreement will be carried out.
13	(G) Due diligence efforts conducted to
14	verify that no shell companies are involved in
15	the offset agreement.
16	(c) Assessment of Corruption Risks From Off-
17	SET AGREEMENTS.—Not later than 1 year after the date
18	of the enactment of this Act, the Secretary of State shall
19	issue regulations under the International Traffic in Arms
20	Regulation and the Secretary of Commerce shall issue reg-
21	ulations under the Export Administration Regulations to
22	require that each notification to Congress required under
23	any provision of law with respect to a sale or export of
24	major defense articles or major defense equipment include,

1	if applicable, an assessment of corruption risks from offset
2	agreements described in subsection (b).
3	SEC. 1299A. CONSIDERATIONS IN FURNISHING MILITARY
4	ASSISTANCE.
5	Section 511 of the Foreign Assistance Act of 1961
6	(22 U.S.C. 2321d) is amended—
7	(1) in paragraph (2), by striking "or" at the
8	end;
9	(2) in paragraph (3), by striking the period at
10	the end and inserting "; or"; and
11	(3) by adding at the end the following:
12	"(4) contribute to corruption in the destination
13	country or provide financial benefit to covered gov-
14	ernment officials (as such term is defined in section
15	1283 of the Protecting Security Assistance from
16	Corruption Act) of that country.".
17	SEC. 1299B. REPORT ON IMPLEMENTATION.
18	(a) In General.—Not later than 120 days after the
19	date of the enactment of this Act—
20	(1) the Secretary of State shall submit to the
21	appropriate congressional committees a report on
22	plans of the Department of State to implement sec-
23	tions 1296, 1297, and 1298; and
24	(2) the Secretary of State and the Secretary of
25	Commerce shall jointly submit to the appropriate

1	congressional committees a report on plans of the
2	Department of State and the Department of Com-
3	merce to implement section 1299.
4	(b) Matters to Be Included.—The report re-
5	quired by subsection (a) shall include—
6	(1) a description of how such assessments and
7	regulations will be incorporated with ongoing De-
8	partment of State initiatives to assess, monitor, and
9	evaluate covered security assistance;
10	(2) the names of the offices within the Depart-
11	ment of State, the Department of Defense, and any
12	other relevant Federal department or agency that
13	will participate in any such assessments and regu-
14	latory implementation;
15	(3) an identification of planned resource alloca-
16	tion for implementation of these sections; and
17	(4) a description of financial, personnel, re-
18	sources, and external limitations on conducting such
19	assessments and regulations and any likely impacts
20	on the integrity of such assessments.
21	(c) FORM.—The report required by subsection (a)
22	shall be submitted in unclassified form.

